QAnon Research: July 18, 2022
Q is back, along with interdisciplinary research asking, "Why and how did people believe in Q the first time?"
Authoritarianism, entertainment, and late-stage capitalism
This month, we’ve got an abundance of conspiracy theory research to dig into. There’s work on platform dynamics, deradicalization, conspiratorial psychology, and authoritarianism. Plus, some QAnon news headlines for you. Submissions have been scarce, so please, if you know any upcoming conferences, journal issues, or publications, send them our way. Happy reading!
Much of the information posted here would be difficult to find without the contributions of our submitters, so we please ask that you submit to our Google form to keep everyone in the loop. We also encourage people to comment on posts on the website and to always feel free to reach out to us. To grow the community, please invite anyone who might be interested by sending out a link to this newsletter:
We look forward to your submissions. Take care!
QAnon (and Conspiracy) in the News
QAnon Creator ‘Q’ Returns After Nearly Two-Year Hiatus [Link]
Will Sommer in The Daily Beast
Buying into Conspiracy Theories can be Exciting – That’s What Makes Them Dangerous [Link]
Donovan Schaefer in The Conversation
Inside the QAnon Crypto Scam That Cost People Millions and One Man His Life [Link]
David Gilbert in Vice
QAnon Fan Is Resurrecting JFK Jr.’s Magazine in Creepy Twist [Link]
Will Sommer in The Daily Beast
Publications
“The Perfect Storm: A Subcultural Analysis of the QAnon Movement” in Critical Sociology [Link]
Christopher (Chris) T. Conner, Visiting Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Missouri Columbia ctckdg@missouri.edu
Nicholas MacMurray
Abstract: In this study, we examine the social phenomenon known as ‘QAnon’. While QAnon is typically thought of as an exclusively online cultural phenomenon, and thus easily dismissed, it has played a significant role in promoting physical acts of violence—including multiple murders and the attack on the United States Capital on 6 January 2021. Utilizing a qualitative analysis of 300 hours of QAnon-related content, we argue that the widespread beliefs held by QAnon supporters were only possible due to the confluence of feelings of distrust in government and other public officials, purveyors of QAnon that profited in the movement’s success, and a populist digital media environment in which extremist ideas are housed and promoted. We conclude by asking if this is a phenomenon created by greater connectivity, or if this is a byproduct of late-stage capitalism in which social relations continue to be atomized.
“The Use of Emotions in Conspiracy and Debunking Videos to Engage Publics on YouTube” in New Media & Society [Link]
Sang Jung Kim and Kaiping Chen
Abstract: With the rise of digital media, conspiracy theories infamous for their emotional manipulation have challenged science epistemology and democratic discourse. Despite extensive literature on misinformation and the role of emotion in persuasion, less is understood about how emotion is used in conspiracy and debunking messages on video platforms and the impact of emotional framing on public engagement with science on social media. Our article fills this gap by analyzing thousands of YouTube videos that propagate or debunk COVID-19 conspiracy theories from March to May 2020. We found that conspiracy and debunking videos used the emotions of trust and fear differently depending on the issue framing of the conspiracy. Our article also reveals a dilemma facing debunking messages—when debunking videos used more trust-related emotions, these videos received more likes yet fewer views. These findings shed new light on the role of emotion on user engagement with misinformation and its correction on digital platforms.
“Conspiracy theories and social media platforms” in Current Opinion in Psychology [Link]
Matteo Cinelli, Gabriele Etta, Michele Avalle, Alessandro Quattrociocchi, Niccolò Di Marco, Carlo Valensise, Alessandro Galeazzi, and Walter Quattrociocchi
Abstract: Conspiracy theories proliferate online. We provide an overview of information consumption patterns related to conspiracy content on four mainstream social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Reddit), with a focus on niche ones. Opinion polarization and echo chambers appear as pivotal elements of communication around conspiracy theories. A relevant role may also be played by the content moderation policies enforced by each social media platform. Banning contents or users from a social media could lead to a level of user segregation that goes beyond echo chambers and reaches the entire social media space, up to the formation of “echo platforms”. The insurgence of echo platforms is a new online phenomenon that needs to be investigated as it could foster many dangerous phenomena that we observe online, including the spreading of conspiracy theories.
“To Convince, to Provoke or to Entertain? A Study on Individual Motivations behind Engaging with Conspiracy Theories Online” in Convergence [Link]
Sophie Morosoli, Peter Van Aelst, and Patrick van Erkel
Abstract: The growing dissemination of conspiracy theories on social media has challenged the well-being of societies. This study aims to understand why individuals would engage with conspiracy theories and what role specific beliefs, but also individual factors such as personality traits play. To answer these questions, we conducted surveys in six countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, the UK and the U.S.) and investigate three motivations (conviction, entertainment and reaction provocation) behind the dissemination of conspiracy content on social media. Our findings demonstrate that across issues, individuals who indicated they would engage with conspiracy theories do it mainly because they are convinced by the message. Political orientation and issue attitudes proof to be connected to individual engagement with conspiracy theories out of conviction, while dark personality traits such as narcissism and psychopathy are valid predictors for why individuals would disseminate conspiracy theories out of entertainment reasons or to provoke reactions.
“Authoritarian Leaders Share Conspiracy Theories to Attack Opponents, Galvanize Followers, Shift Blame, and Undermine Democratic Institutions” in Current Opinion in Psychology [Link]
Zhiying (Bella) Ren, Andrew M. Carton, Eugen Dimant, and Maurice E. Schweitzer
Abstract: Although many virtuous leaders are guided by the ideal of prioritizing the needs and welfare of their subordinates, others advance their self-interest at the expense of the people they purport to serve. In this article, we discuss conspiracy theories as a tool that leaders use to advance their personal interests. We propose that leaders spread conspiracy theories in service of four primary goals: 1) to attack opponents; 2) to galvanize followers; 3) to shift blame and responsibility; and 4) to undermine institutions that threaten their power. We argue that authoritarian, populist, and conservative leaders are most likely to spread conspiracy theories during periods of instability.
“Mindsets of Conspiracy: A Typology of Affinities Towards Conspiracy Myths in Digital Environments” in Convergence [Link]
Lisa Schwaiger, Jörg Schneider, Adrian Rauchfleisch, and Mark Eisenegger
Abstract: In times of crisis, the spread of conspiracy myths increases since people seek answers to complex questions. Besides societal aspects, social media platforms, especially messenger services, have been identified as a positive driver for spreading conspiracy myths. Much research focused on whether right-wing populist attitudes correlate with belief in conspiracy myths resulting in inconsistent findings. We show that different anti-system attitudes and corresponding digital media usage can promote the affinity towards conspiracy myths apart from right-wing attitudes. With this paper, we first want to sharpen the terminology on ‘conspiracy myths’ and develop a scale to measure affinity towards conspiracy myths in different dimensions. We second use this scale to investigate different mindsets of conspiracy in the Swiss population. Third, we want to find out how the dimensions correlate with messenger usage. Based on data from a representative population survey in Switzerland from November to December 2020, we investigated different affinities towards conspiracy myths, represented by far-left, far-right, populist, anti-elitism, general anti-system attitudes and science skepticism. We then used the six dimensions in a cluster analysis and identified five typological mindsets. About 30% of the population accordingly have higher affinities towards conspiracy myths than the rest. Our study also highlights the potential role of messenger services in spreading conspiracy myths. To a certain extent, Facebook Messenger and Telegram usage show a robust correlation with the different dimensions of the affinity towards conspiracy myths. In contrast, WhatsApp usage does not show a robust correlation.
Resources
Webinar Recording: Gaming and Gamification in Extremism and [Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism] Interventions [Link]
From the Radicalisation Awareness Network
Website: Populism and Conspiracy Theory [Link]
From the European Research Council